



UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov

M

APPLICATION NO.	FILING DATE	FIRST NAMED INVENTOR	ATTORNEY DOCKET NO.	CONFIRMATION NO.
10/645,043	08/21/2003	David Bebbington	VPI/00-109 DIV US	7317
27916	7590	06/28/2004	EXAMINER	
VERTEX PHARMACEUTICALS INC. 130 WAVERLY STREET CAMBRIDGE, MA 02139-4242			KIFLE, BRUCK	
		ART UNIT	PAPER NUMBER	
		1624		

DATE MAILED: 06/28/2004

Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.

Office Action Summary

Application No.	BEBBINGTON ET AL.	
10/645,043	Examiner	Art Unit
	Bruck Kifle, Ph.D.	1624

-- The MAILING DATE of this communication appears on the cover sheet with the correspondence address --

Period for Reply

A SHORTENED STATUTORY PERIOD FOR REPLY IS SET TO EXPIRE 3 MONTH(S) FROM THE MAILING DATE OF THIS COMMUNICATION.

- Extensions of time may be available under the provisions of 37 CFR 1.136(a). In no event, however, may a reply be timely filed after SIX (6) MONTHS from the mailing date of this communication.
- If the period for reply specified above is less than thirty (30) days, a reply within the statutory minimum of thirty (30) days will be considered timely.
- If NO period for reply is specified above, the maximum statutory period will apply and will expire SIX (6) MONTHS from the mailing date of this communication.
- Failure to reply within the set or extended period for reply will, by statute, cause the application to become ABANDONED (35 U.S.C. § 133). Any reply received by the Office later than three months after the mailing date of this communication, even if timely filed, may reduce any earned patent term adjustment. See 37 CFR 1.704(b).

Status

- 1) Responsive to communication(s) filed on 21 August 2003.
- 2a) This action is **FINAL**. 2b) This action is non-final.
- 3) Since this application is in condition for allowance except for formal matters, prosecution as to the merits is closed in accordance with the practice under *Ex parte Quayle*, 1935 C.D. 11, 453 O.G. 213.

Disposition of Claims

- 4) Claim(s) 1-38 is/are pending in the application.
- 4a) Of the above claim(s) _____ is/are withdrawn from consideration.
- 5) Claim(s) _____ is/are allowed.
- 6) Claim(s) 1-38 is/are rejected.
- 7) Claim(s) _____ is/are objected to.
- 8) Claim(s) _____ are subject to restriction and/or election requirement.

Application Papers

- 9) The specification is objected to by the Examiner.
- 10) The drawing(s) filed on _____ is/are: a) accepted or b) objected to by the Examiner.
Applicant may not request that any objection to the drawing(s) be held in abeyance. See 37 CFR 1.85(a).
Replacement drawing sheet(s) including the correction is required if the drawing(s) is objected to. See 37 CFR 1.121(d).
- 11) The oath or declaration is objected to by the Examiner. Note the attached Office Action or form PTO-152.

Priority under 35 U.S.C. § 119

- 12) Acknowledgment is made of a claim for foreign priority under 35 U.S.C. § 119(a)-(d) or (f).
a) All b) Some * c) None of:
 1. Certified copies of the priority documents have been received.
 2. Certified copies of the priority documents have been received in Application No. _____.
 3. Copies of the certified copies of the priority documents have been received in this National Stage application from the International Bureau (PCT Rule 17.2(a)).

* See the attached detailed Office action for a list of the certified copies not received.

Attachment(s)

- 1) Notice of References Cited (PTO-892)
- 2) Notice of Draftsperson's Patent Drawing Review (PTO-948)
- 3) Information Disclosure Statement(s) (PTO-1449 or PTO/SB/08)
Paper No(s)/Mail Date 11/20/03.
- 4) Interview Summary (PTO-413)
Paper No(s)/Mail Date. _____.
- 5) Notice of Informal Patent Application (PTO-152)
- 6) Other: _____.

Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 112

Claims 1-38 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112, second paragraph, as being indefinite for failing to particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter which applicant regards as the invention.

- i) In claim 1 one cannot say for sure which disease is alleviated by treatment with a caspase inhibitor and which disease is not. There is no way one skilled in the art can say for sure whether a given disease is embraced by the claims or not.
- ii) The term "heterocycl" in the definition of "R" is indefinite because it is not known how many atoms make up the ring, which atoms are present and what kind of a ring (monocyclic, bicyclic, spiro, fused, bridged, saturated, etc.) is intended. See also R₃.
- iii) In the definition of "Y" it is unclear which leaving group is intended and which one is not or under what conditions the leaving group is supposed to leave.
- iv) In the definition of R² it is still unclear which esters or amides are intended. Is only the methyl ester (-COOCH₃) and -CONH₂ (carboxamido) groups intended or are other groups also intended? If so, which ones? It is also still unclear which isosteres are intended. Esters and Amides are molecules and do not have an open valency. One cannot say what is intended.
- v) It is unclear which group is capable of fitting into S2 sub-site of a caspase and which one is not. It is also unclear whether this group may include all metals (Uranium, Plutonium, Mercury, Arsenic, etc.), any and all functional groups, etc., or whether only hydrogen and alkyl radicals are intended. A clarification is required.

Claims 1-8, 17-29 and 38 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112, first paragraph, as failing to comply with the written description requirement. The claims contain subject matter which was not described in the specification in such a way as to reasonably convey to one skilled in the relevant art that the inventor(s), at the time the application was filed, had possession of the claimed invention.

The claims require “a group capable of fitting into the S2 sub-site of a caspase.” The claims do not require that this radical possess any particular conserved structure, or other distinguishing feature.

To provide adequate written description and evidence of possession of a claimed genus, the specification must provide sufficient distinguishing identifying characteristics of the genus. The factors to be considered include disclosure of complete or partial structure, physical and/or chemical properties, functional characteristics, structure/function correlation, methods of making the claimed product, or any combination thereof. The specification does not identify any particular portion of the structure that must be conserved, nor does it provide a disclosure of structure/function correlation. The distinguishing characteristics of the claimed group are not described. Accordingly, the specification does not provide adequate written description of the claimed group.

To satisfy the written-description requirement, the specification must describe every element of the claimed invention in sufficient detail so that one of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that the inventor possessed the claimed invention at the time of filing. *Vas-Cath*, 935 F.3d at 1563; see also *Lockwood v. American Airlines, Inc.*, 107 F.3d 1565, 1572 [41 USPQ2d 1961] (Fed. Cir. 1997) (patent specification must describe an invention and do so in sufficient

detail that one skilled in the art can clearly conclude that “the inventor invented the claimed invention”); *In re Gosteli*, 872 F.2d 1008, 1012 [10 USPQ2d 1614] (Fed. Cir. 1989) (“the description must clearly allow persons of ordinary skill in the art to recognize that [the inventor] invented what is claimed”). Thus, an applicant complies with the written-description requirement “by describing the invention, with all its claimed limitations, not that which makes it obvious,” and by using “such descriptive means as words, structures, figures, diagrams, formulas, etc., that set forth the claimed invention.” *Lockwood*, 107 F.3d at 1572.

See *University of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co.*, 68 USPQ2d 1424 (DC WNY 2003) and *University of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co. et al.* CAFC [(03-1304) 13 February 2004]. In *University of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co.* a patent directed to method for inhibiting prostaglandin synthesis in a human host using an unspecified compound, in order to relieve pain without side effect of stomach irritation, did not satisfy written description requirement of 35 U.S.C. §112, since the patent described the compound's desired function of reducing activity of the enzyme PGHS-2 without adversely affecting PGHS-1 enzyme activity, but did not identify said compound, since the invention consists of performing “assays” to screen compounds in order to discover those with the desired effect. The patent did not name even one compound that assays would identify as suitable for practice of the invention, or provide information such that one skilled in art could identify a suitable compound. And since the specification did not indicate that compounds are available in public depository, the claimed treatment method cannot be practiced without the compound. Thus the inventors cannot be said to have “possessed” the claimed invention without knowing of a compound or method certain to produce said compound.

Thus said patent constituted an invitation to experiment to first identify, then characterize, and then use a therapeutic a class of compound defined only by their desired properties.

According to the MPEP §2163 I. A. “the issue of a lack of adequate written description may arise even for an original claim when an aspect of the claimed invention has not been described with sufficient particularity such that one skilled in the art would recognize that the applicant had possession of the claimed invention. The claimed invention as a whole may not be adequately described if the claims require an essential or critical feature which is not adequately described in the specification and which is not conventional in the art or known to one of ordinary skill in the art.” The MPEP states in §2163 II 3 ii) “The written description requirement for a claimed genus may be satisfied through sufficient description of a representative number of species by actual reduction to practice (see i)(A), above), reduction to drawings (see i)(B), above), or by disclosure of relevant, identifying characteristics, i.e., structure or other physical and/or chemical properties, by functional characteristics coupled with a known or disclosed correlation between function and structure, or by a combination of such identifying characteristics, sufficient to show the applicant was in possession of the claimed genus (see i)(C), above). See *Eli Lilly*, 119 F.3d at 1568, 43 USPQ2d at 1406.” Applicants have made no assertion that there is any correlation between the biological function of the compound being claimed and its structure.

According to the MPEP §2163.02 Standard for Determining Compliance With the Written Description Requirement,

“The courts have described the essential question to be addressed in a description requirement issue in a variety of ways. An objective standard for determining compliance with the written description requirement is, “does the description clearly allow persons of ordinary skill in the art to recognize that he or she

invented what is claimed". *In re Gosteli*, 872 F.2d 1008, 1012, 10 USPQ2d 1614, 1618 (Fed. Cir. 1989). Under *Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Mahurkar*, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563-64, 19 USPQ2d 1111, 1117 (Fed. Cir. 1991), to satisfy the written description requirement, an applicant must convey with reasonable clarity to those skilled in the art that, as of the filing date sought, he or she was in possession of the invention, and that the invention, in that context, is whatever is now claimed. The test for sufficiency of support in a parent application is whether the disclosure of the application relied upon "reasonably conveys to the artisan that the inventor had possession at that time of the later claimed subject matter". *Ralston Purina Co. v. Far-Mar-Co., Inc.*, 772 F.2d 1570, 1575, 227 USPQ 177, 179 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (quoting *In re Kaslow*, 707 F.2d 1366, 1375, 217 USPQ 1089, 1096 (Fed. Cir. 1983))."

This case was filed before Applicants had a clear idea of the structures of their desired compounds, how to make their compounds and how to use them.

Applicants are reminded of what the U.S. Court of Appeals Federal Circuit wrote in *University of California v. Eli Lilly and Co.* 43 USPQ2d 1398, "In claims involving chemical materials, generic formulae usually indicate with specificity what the generic claims encompass. One skilled in the art can distinguish such a formula from others and can identify many of the species that the claims encompass. Accordingly, such a formula is normally an adequate description of the claimed genus." "A definition by function, as we have previously indicated, does not suffice to define the genus because it is only an indication of what the gene does, rather than what it is. See *Fiers*, 984 F.2d at 1169-71, 25 USPQ2d at 1605-06 (discussing Amgen). "It is only a definition of a useful result rather than a definition of what achieves that result." "The description requirement of the patent statute requires a description of an invention, not an indication of a result that one might achieve if one made that invention. See *In re Wilder*, 736 F.2d 1516, 1521, 222 USPQ 369, 372-73 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (affirming rejection because the specification does "little more than outlin[e] goals appellants hope the claimed invention achieves and the problems the invention will hopefully ameliorate.")".

In *Fiers v. Sugano*, 25 USPQ2d 1601, U.S. Court of Appeals Federal Circuit repeated its views concerning the propriety of defining a chemical by its function and emphasized that for all chemicals including DNA “Claiming all DNA's that achieve a result without defining what means will do so is not in compliance with the description requirement; it is an attempt to preempt the future before it has arrived.” They further required the inventor to have a “mental picture of the structure of the chemical, or is able to define it by its method of preparation, its physical or chemical properties, or whatever characteristics sufficiently distinguish it. It is not sufficient to define it solely by its principal biological property.”

Both *Fiers v. Sugano*, 25 USPQ2d 1601 and *Amgen Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd.* 18 USPQ2d 1016 were quoted with approval by the U.S. Court of Appeals Federal Circuit in *Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr Laboratories Inc.*, 32 USPQ2d 1915 who added, “An idea is definite and permanent when the inventor has a specific, settled idea, a particular solution to the problem at hand, not just a general goal or research plan he hopes to pursue. ... The conception analysis necessarily turns on the inventor's ability to describe his invention with particularity. Until he can do so, he cannot prove possession of the complete mental picture of the invention. These rules ensure that patent rights attach only when an idea is so far developed that the inventor can point to a definite, particular invention.”

Therefore the full breadth of the claim fails to meet the written description provision of 35 U.S.C. §112, first paragraph. Applicant is reminded that *Vas-Cath* makes clear that the written description provision of 35 U.S.C. §112 is severable from its enablement provision.

Claims 1-21 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112, first paragraph, as containing subject matter which was not described in the specification in such a way as to enable one skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and/or use the invention.

In evaluating the enablement question, several factors are to be considered. Note In re Wands, 8 USPQ2d 1400 and Ex parte Forman, 230 USPQ 546. The factors include: 1) The nature of the invention, 2) the state of the prior art, 3) the predictability or lack thereof in the art, 4) the amount of direction or guidance present, 5) the presence or absence of working examples, 6) the breadth of the claims, and 7) the quantity of experimentation needed.

1) The nature of the invention: The method of use claims are drawn to the treatment of any and all kinds of human diseases or conditions which are unrelated and not known to be treated pharmacologically. The claims are drawn to a method of treating a caspase mediated disease.

The dependent claims are drawn to treating a wide variety of diseases such as, degenerative disease, leukemias and related disorders, Alzheimer's disease, Parkinson's disease, Huntington's disease, ALS, aging, viral mediated disease, various forms of liver disease, renal disease, etc.

2) The state of the prior art: There are no known compounds that can treat all of the diseases embraced by these claims. For example, there are no known compounds of which have been demonstrated to treat a degenerative diseases generally. Treatment of degenerative disorders generally is *prima facie* not enabled. This is because these disorders are not treatable using the same drug due to their difference characteristics. For example, Parkinson's disease patients are treated with dopamine agonists and AD patients are treated using acetylcholinesterase inhibitors

(albeit not effectively). The notion that degenerative problems can be treated generally is contrary to current medical understanding. Also, there is no such thing as an anti-viral drug.

Liver diseases and renal disease include tumors and non-tumors.

There is no treatment for aging.

3) The predictability or lack thereof in the art: There is no evidence of record which would enable the skilled artisan in the treatment of any of the diseases recited. The skill level in this art is low relative to the difficulty of the task and requires undue experimentation.

4) The amount of direction or guidance present and 5) the presence or absence of working examples: There are no doses present to direct one to treat disorders cited and there are no working examples.

6) The breadth of the claims: The claims are drawn to the treatment of diseases whose treatment is unknown (see for example "aging").

7) The quantity of experimentation need would be an undue burden to one skilled in the pharmaceutical arts since there is inadequate guidance given to the skilled artisan for the many reasons stated above.

Thus, factors such as "sufficient working examples", "the level of skill in the art" and "predictability", etc. have been demonstrated to be sufficiently lacking in the instant case for the instant method claims.

Double Patenting

The nonstatutory double patenting rejection is based on a judicially created doctrine grounded in public policy (a policy reflected in the statute) so as to prevent the unjustified or improper timewise extension of the "right to exclude" granted by a patent and to prevent possible harassment by multiple assignees. See *In re Goodman*, 11 F.3d 1046, 29 USPQ2d 2010 (Fed.

Cir. 1993); *In re Longi*, 759 F.2d 887, 225 USPQ 645 (Fed. Cir. 1985); *In re Van Ornum*, 686 F.2d 937, 214 USPQ 761 (CCPA 1982); *In re Vogel*, 422 F.2d 438, 164 USPQ 619 (CCPA 1970); and, *In re Thorington*, 418 F.2d 528, 163 USPQ 644 (CCPA 1969).

A timely filed terminal disclaimer in compliance with 37 CFR 1.321(c) may be used to overcome an actual or provisional rejection based on a nonstatutory double patenting ground provided the conflicting application or patent is shown to be commonly owned with this application. See 37 CFR 1.130(b).

Effective January 1, 1994, a registered attorney or agent of record may sign a terminal disclaimer. A terminal disclaimer signed by the assignee must fully comply with 37 CFR 3.73(b).

Claims 1-38 are rejected under the judicially created doctrine of obviousness-type double patenting as being unpatentable over claims 1-59 of U.S. Patent No. 6,689,784. Although the conflicting claims are not identical, they are not patentably distinct from each other because the patented claims are fully embraced by the pending claims.

Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to Bruck Kifle, Ph.D. whose telephone number is 571-272-0668. The examiner can normally be reached on 9:30-6:00.

If attempts to reach the examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the examiner's supervisor, Mukund J. Shah can be reached on 571-272-0674. The fax phone number for the organization where this application or proceeding is assigned is (703) 872-9306.

Any inquiry of a general nature or relating to the status of this application or proceeding should be directed to the receptionist whose telephone number is 703-308-1235.


Bruck Kifle, Ph.D.
Primary Examiner
Art Unit 1624

BK
June 23, 2004